PENERAPAN PRINSIP CHECK AND BALANCES DALAM HUBUNGAN EKSEKUTIF DAN LEGISLATIF DI INDONESIA

Abstract

This study examines the implementation of the check and balances principle in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in Indonesia. This principle, derived from Montesquieu's concept of separation of powers, aims to maintain power equilibrium, prevent dominance by one institution, and ensure accountable and democratic governance. The research employs a normative legal method with statutory, conceptual, and case approaches, using library research on the 1945 Constitution, relevant laws, Constitutional Court decisions, and secondary legal literature. The findings indicate that, normatively, the 1945 Constitution provides sufficient instruments through the legislative, budgeting, and oversight functions of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the executive powers of the President. However, in practice, challenges persist, including executive dominance, political party interests, and suboptimal legislative oversight. The Constitutional Court and civil society participation play critical roles in maintaining power balance. The study concludes that strengthening DPR institutions, legislative transparency, and synergy between critical oversight and constructive cooperation are essential for effective implementation of the check and balances principle within Indonesia’s presidential system. These findings are expected to contribute to the development of constitutional law and the practice of constitutional democracy in Indonesia.